



Institute of Actuaries of India

Evidence on funding, fund mandates and investment risks of Indian DB schemes

Mayur Ankolekar

13th Current Issues in Retirement Benefits

August 11, 2017


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Presentation Flow

1. Motivation
2. Approach
3. Ind AS 19 and investment philosophy
4. Data structure
5. Hypothesis testing
6. Trends
7. Summary and conclusion
8. Further research

Motivation

1. Ind AS 19 transition
2. Greater forbearance to the volatility of asset returns
3. Investment risks commensurate to liabilities?
4. Effect of investment risks on
 - a. Funding level?
 - b. Fund manager?
5. Can lead a further ground for longitudinal research on funding, fund managers and risks taken by Indian DB funds



Approach

Data set

- **Gratuity funds**
- **NSE 50 companies (March 2014, 2015, 2016)**
- **Consolidated for Indian subsidiaries, else standalone**

Funding level, Fund Manager

- **Funding level (% assets to liabilities)**
- **Funding level classified by value of assets**
- **Fund manager: self-managed, insurer-managed, part-self and part-insurer.**

In a nutshell

Asset-side risk acceptance

- **Experience gain/ loss on assets**
- **As % of expected return on assets**
- **Stands out only when interest rates oscillate significantly between two FYs.**

Analyses

- **Does funding level affect fund manager choice?**
- **Does funding level affect asset side risks?**
- **Does fund manager choice affect asset side risks?**

Questions

To conduct the following evidence-based analyses on the current level of investment risks assumed by Indian post-employment defined benefit plans:

1. Are commensurate investment risks accepted?
2. Are assets managed in-house or outsourced?
3. Is the attitude to investment risk-taking affected by the plan's funding levels?
4. How does regulation affect the investment risks taken?
5. What are the options for greater risk-taking?

Effect of change, Ind AS 19

Approach toward investment risk and ALM could dramatically change in Indian Defined Benefit Plans.


Breaking down of income between

- a) **Statement of Comprehensive Income (i.e., P&L Account), and**
- b) **Statement of OCI (i.e., in Shareholders' Equity)**

Proponents of the breaking down of income argue that this treatment improves the predictive power of financial statements.

Will the reduced risk to P&L spur higher investment risk?


What is the current level of risk-taking?




Investment Regulation

Approved Status: Fully exempts the fund's income from tax (E-E-E). Obligates the fund to invest as per the investment regulations.

Not Approved Status: It could possibly invest at free-will.



Current regulation around Insurer-Managed funds



Important assumption & coordinates

Consistency in the actuarial valuation methodologies, classification of assets, calculation of expected return on plan assets (EROA), and evaluation of asset-side actuarial gains and losses.

Who Manages?

- Is the plan A) insurer-managed, or B) self-managed or C) part self-/part insurer-managed?
- Does the fund size affect trustees' approach toward the fund manager?

How Much Risk Is Assumed?

- Based on the volatility of actual asset returns as compared with the expected returns.

What Is The Extent Of Plan Funding?

- Ratio of plan Assets to Plan Liabilities.

When the proportion of funds managed by the insurer or by the company exceeded 15% of the total funds, the fund was classified as part self-/part insurer-managed.

Data Sources And Period

**Indian NSE 50
Largest Companies**



**Consolidated
Financial Accounts**

Although both life pension and gratuity constitute defined benefits that could be offered to employees, most Indian private sector companies do not offer life pension benefits.



Gratuity Funds



**Investment
Strategy Of
Defined Benefit
Funds**

47 of the NSE 50 are funded with average funding ratio of 92%.

Longitudinal data on funding level and fund mandates NSE50 companies

| Funding Level | FY 2013-14 | FY 2014-15 | FY 2015-16 |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Assets (Rs million) | 308,925 | 458,157 | 450,919 |
| Liabilities (Rs million) | 343,661 | 513,126 | 491,172 |
| Aggregate funding level | 89.89% | 89.29% | 91.80% |

Longitudinal data on funding level and fund mandates

| Fund mandates | FY 2013-14 | FY 2014-15 | FY 2015-16 |
|------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Insurer managed | 55,933 | 178,865 | 192,318 |
| Part self/part insurer | 191,961 | 214,113 | 222,285 |
| Self managed | 61,032 | 65,178 | 36,317 |
| Total | 308,925 | 458,157 | 450,919 |

| Fund mandates | FY 2013-14 | FY 2014-15 | FY 2015-16 |
|------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Insurer managed | 18.1% | 39.0% | 42.7% |
| Part self/part insurer | 62.1% | 46.7% | 49.3% |
| Self managed | 19.8% | 14.2% | 8.1% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% |


Summarized NSE 50 asset information FY 2015-16

| Funding Level | Insurer Managed | Part insurer/ Part self | Self-Managed | Unfunded | Total (all Rs Million) |
|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|
| Less than 10% | 66 | 15 | - | - | 81 |
| 10% - 25% | 426 | - | - | - | 426 |
| 25% - 50% | - | - | - | - | - |
| 50% - 75% | 15,335 | 3,917 | 5,729 | - | 24,981 |
| 75% - 90% | 10,242 | 20,701 | - | - | 30,943 |
| 90% - 100% | 155,454 | 151,419 | 23,205 | - | 330,078 |
| 100%+ | 10,795 | 46,233 | 7,382 | - | 64,410 |
| Total Assets | 192,318 | 222,285 | 36,317 | - | 450,919 |

Summarized NSE 50 asset information FY 2015-16

| Asset Size (Rs million) | Insurer Managed | Part insurer/ Part self | Self-Managed | Unfunded | Total |
|-------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------|--------------|----------|-----------|
| > 20,000 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| 5,000 - 20,000 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 15 |
| 2,500 - 5,000 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 8 |
| 500 - 2,500 | 10 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 15 |
| < 500 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 8 |
| Total | 24 | 15 | 8 | 3 | 50 |

Asset side risks




**Fluctuation due to change
in interest rates**

Measuring investment risks from financial statement disclosures

| Company | FY | ACTGL (Rs million) | Asset Allocation |
|-----------------|---------|--------------------|---|
| Tata Motors | 2013-14 | -233.7 | Debt sec-71%, Insurer managed-28%, Bank -1% |
| | 2014-15 | 259.7 | Debt sec-73%, Insurer managed-21%, Bank -6% |
| | 2015-16 | 198.1 | Debt sec-79%, Insurer managed-19%, Bank-2% |
| Larsen & Toubro | 2013-14 | -101.7 | Gsec-30%, State Gsec-11%, Corp bonds-29%, Equity-2%, Insurer Managed-1%, PSU bonds-20%, Others-7% |
| | 2014-15 | 329.9 | Gsec-31%, State Gsec-11%, Corp bonds-30%, Equity-2%, Insurer Managed-1%, PSU bonds-17%, Others-8% |
| | 2015-16 | 123.6 | Gsec-23%, State Gsec-18%, Corp bonds-34%, Equity-2%, PSU bonds-14%, Others-9% |

Funds invested in MTM long-dated debt will report

- actuarial losses in FY 2013-14, and
- actuarial gains in FY 2014-15.



How much **RISK** is assumed??

Risk Ratio=

High risk if the ratio lies beyond $\pm 40\%$ (i.e. for $\Delta 100$ bps, over 3.2% experience gain/ loss at base interest of 8%. Asset duration ≥ 3.2 yr commensurate risk)


$$\frac{\text{Actuarial Gain/Loss On Plan Assets OR Experience Adjustments On Plan Assets}}{\text{Expected Return On Plan Assets}}$$

Actuarial Gains/Losses arise from either:

1. **Change in assumptions** between the previous year and the current year
2. **Experience** in the current year being different from the assumptions.

Experience gain (loss): **Indicator Of Risk**

Stock of investment risk assumed



| | Exp gain (loss) to EROA > 40% | Smooth asset returns |
|------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|
| FY 2013-14 | 11 companies | 39 companies |
| FY 2014-15 | 15 companies | 35 companies |

During the two valuation dates (31.3.2014 & 31.3.2015), the risk free interest rate oscillated by over 100 basis points.

Changes in asset returns are expected in self managed funds and Unit-linked insurance plans (long duration debt).

During the intra year interest rate fluctuation (over 100 bps)

| FY 2014-15 | | | | FY 2013-14 | | |
|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------------|----------------|---------------------|---------------------------|----------------|
| Funding Level | Number of Companies | Average Funding Level (%) | Risk Ratio (%) | Number of Companies | Average Funding Level (%) | Risk Ratio (%) |
| < 10% | 4 | 2 | 150 | 5 | 3 | -29 |
| 10%-25% | 2 | 20 | 26 | 2 | 25 | 20 |
| 25%-50% | 3 | 45 | 6 | 1 | 42 | 23 |
| 50%-75% | 4 | 59 | 35 | 9 | 61 | -9 |
| 75%-90% | 9 | 80 | 48 | 6 | 85 | -6 |
| 90%-100% | 17 | 95 | 19 | 15 | 95 | 2 |
| 100%+ | 11 | 108 | -1 | 12 | 102 | -2 |
| Total | 50 | 89 | 18 | 50 | 90 | -1 |

High risk ratio increasingly points to market-linked insurance plans

| FY 2013-14 | | |
|---------------------|------------|-----------------|
| Company | Risk Ratio | Fund Manager |
| IndusInd Bank | -69% | Insurer Managed |
| Yes Bank | -62% | Insurer Managed |
| Hindustan Unilever | 44% | Insurer Managed |
| Kotak Mahindra Bank | 60% | Insurer Managed |

| FY 2014-15 | | |
|---------------------|------------|-----------------|
| Company | Risk Ratio | Fund Manager |
| Grasim | 41% | Insurer Managed |
| Dr. Reddy's | 54% | Insurer Managed |
| HDFC Bank | 125% | Insurer Managed |
| Kotak Mahindra Bank | 272% | Insurer Managed |

| FY 2015-16 | | |
|---------------|------------|------------------------|
| Company | Risk Ratio | Fund Manager |
| Cipla | -70% | Insurer Managed |
| ICICI Bank | -67% | Part Self/Part Insurer |
| HDFC Bank | -63% | Insurer Managed |
| Yes Bank | -46% | Insurer Managed |
| Idea Cellular | 47% | Insurer Managed |

10% drop in Nifty between end of FY 2014-15 to FY 2015-16

Equity proportion of UL plans is sometimes disclosed

| All figs in Rs million | Proportion in equity | ACTGL | Exp gain (loss) | EROA | Exp/EROA |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------|-------|-----------------|------|-------------|
| ACC (insurer managed) | 9% | 18 | 18 | 148 | 12% |
| HDFC (insurer managed) | 12% | -14 | 9 | 140 | 6% |
| HDFC Bank (insurer managed) | 37% | -136 | -136 | 217 | -63% |
| ICICI Bank (self managed) | 11% | -398 | -398 | 597 | -67% |
| Kotak Mahindra Bank (insurer managed) | 20% | -77 | -81 | 228 | -36% |



Source: Annual reports FY 2015-16

Professional guidance to disclose equity assets if UL plans are the pass through vehicle?

“Risk ratio” (Exp GL/ EROA) would not work in FY 2015-16!
G Sec yield steady between 31 Mar 2015 and 31 Mar 2016

| Funding Level | Number of Companies | Liabilities (Rs Million) | Assets (Rs Million) | Asset Experience gain/ (loss) (Rs Million) | EROA (Rs Million) | Asset Exp Gain/(Loss) : EROA |
|---------------|---------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|--|-------------------|------------------------------|
| Less than 10% | 5 | 8,866 | 81 | -1 | 10 | -10.00% |
| 10% - 25% | 1 | 1,968 | 426 | 9 | 20 | 46.87% |
| 25% - 50% | 0 | - | - | - | - | 0.00% |
| 50% - 75% | 9 | 36,410 | 24,981 | -67 | 1,560 | -4.26% |
| 75% - 90% | 9 | 35,802 | 30,943 | -288 | 2,215 | -13.02% |
| 90% - 100% | 18 | 346,595 | 330,078 | 1,245 | 26,313 | 4.73% |
| 100%+ | 8 | 61,531 | 64,410 | 265 | 4,896 | 5.41% |
| Total | 50 | 491,172 | 450,919 | 1,163 | 35,014 | 3.32% |

Data For Statistical Analyses



Tests

Tabulated Information



Research questions:

1. Is the funding level affected by the choice of assets, that is, does having less volatile assets increase or decrease the funding level of the plan?
2. Is the investment risk-taking of the funds independent of the funding level?
3. Is the investment risk-taking of the funds independent of the fund manager?
4. Is the funding level independent of the fund manager?

Mann-Whitney U Test

1. Examines if two samples belong to the same underlying population.
2. Non-parametric, can be applied to unknown probability distributions.

Assumptions:

- The two investigated groups must be randomly drawn from the target population.
- Each measurement or observation must correspond to a different participant.
- Ordinal data measurement scale.

Limitations:

Same average but different variances would likely lead to erroneous results.

Mann-Whitney U Test: Funding Ratio v. Fund Manager

To test for a significant difference in the funding ratio based on fund classification

- H_0 : There is no significant difference in the distribution of the funding ratio based on fund manager.
- H_1 : There is a significant difference in the distribution of the funding ratio based on fund manager.

| FY 2014-15 | |
|----------------------------|-------|
| no observations Group FV | 19 |
| no observations Group Trad | 28 |
| T | 406 |
| Obs U | 216 |
| E(U) | 266 |
| s.d.(U) | 46.13 |
| z value | -1.08 |
| p-value | 0.14 |

| FY 2015-16 | |
|----------------------------|-------|
| no observations Group FV | 19 |
| no observations Group Trad | 28 |
| T | 422 |
| Obs U | 232 |
| E(U) | 266 |
| s.d.(U) | 46.13 |
| z value | -0.74 |
| p-value | 0.23 |

T= Sum Of Ranks Of Group “FV”

Obs U= T Minus “Sum Of Ranked Observations Of Group FV”

Since the p-value is sufficiently large for both years, the null hypothesis holds, i.e., there is no significant difference in the distribution of the funding ratio based on fund classification.

Funding ratios are not reflective of the riskiness of the underlying investment strategy

Independence of funding v. risk taken and discretionary funding

The possibility of Type I error (rejecting H_0 when true) is higher when the Mann Whitney U test is applied in a situation of distinct variances.

It is believed that the population variances for funding ratios would not be different for “traditional” and “fair value” asset plans.

In India, DB plan funding is discretionary i.e., no minimum funding requirement. Employers neither maintain funding ratios that are similar nor link the choice of assets to the funding ratio.

Funding ratios are not reflective of the riskiness of the underlying investment strategies. This is held by the Mann-Whitney U test result.

Chi-squared Test:

Testing for the independence of attributes

1. The chi-squared statistic is arrived at by summing the ratio of all squared differences between observed and expected frequencies to the expected frequencies.
2. This is then compared with the critical value to evaluate independence or otherwise with a defined level of confidence.

Limitations:

1. It does not reveal the strength of the inter-relationship among the attributes of interest.
2. Sensitive to sample size.
3. Also sensitive to small expected frequencies in one or more cells.

Is the investment risk-taking of the funds independent of the funding level?

Is the investment risk-taking of the funds independent of the fund manager?

Is the funding level independent of the fund manager?

Chi-Squared Test: Funding level v. Risk taking

H_0 : The funding ratio is independent of investment risk-taking

H_1 : The funding ratio is not independent of the riskiness of the investment strategy

The hypothesis is tested by using the classification of data by funding ratio and risk ratio.

| | Funding Ratio | | | |
|---|---------------------------|------------|------------------|-------|
| Risk Ratio (Act. Gain/loss: EROA) | Less than or equal to 50% | 50% to 90% | Greater than 90% | Total |
| Exceeds 40% | 0 | 2 | 4 | 6 |
| 40% to 0% | 3 | 14 | 24 | 41 |
| Chi-Square Statistic | | | | 5.42 |
| Critical Value at 5% level of significance (2 d.o.f.) | | | | 5.99 |

Since the calculated chi-squared statistic does not exceed the critical value, there is no reason to reject the null hypothesis

The funding ratio is independent of investment risk-taking.

Chi-Squared Test: Fund Manager v. Risk taking

H_0 : Investment risk-taking is independent of the fund manager

H_1 : Investment risk-taking is not independent of the fund manager

Data is tabulated by fund manager and risk ratio.

| | Fund Manager | | | |
|---|-----------------|------------------------|--------------|-------|
| Risk Ratio (ACTGL: EROA) | Insurer Managed | Part self/part Insurer | Self Managed | Total |
| Exceeds 40% | 3 | 2 | 1 | 6 |
| 40% to 0% | 22 | 13 | 6 | 41 |
| Chi-Square Statistic | | | 1.26 | |
| Critical Value at 5% level of significance (2 d.o.f.) | | | 5.99 | |

As the observed chi-squared statistic does not exceed the critical value, there is no reason to reject the null hypothesis

The risk taken by a fund is not determined by fund manager choice.

Chi-Squared Test: Fund Manager v. Funding Level

H_0 : The funding ratio is independent of the fund manager

H_1 : The funding ratio is not independent of the fund manager

The hypothesis is tested by classifying data by fund manager and funding level

| | Fund Manager | | | |
|---|-----------------|-------------------------|--------------|-------|
| Funding Ratio | Insurer Managed | Part self/ part Insurer | Self Managed | Total |
| ≤50% | 2 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| 50% to 90% | 9 | 5 | 2 | 16 |
| Greater than 90% | 15 | 9 | 4 | 28 |
| Chi-Square Statistic | | | | 2.19 |
| Critical Value at 5% level of significance (4 d.o.f.) | | | | 9.48 |

As the observed chi-squared statistic does not exceed the critical value, there is no reason to reject the null hypothesis.

The funding ratio is independent of the choice of fund manager

Regulation and asset profile

Regulation often drives the asset risk profile

While general risk management has become increasingly sophisticated, it is often driven more by regulatory and accounting issues than by the pension fund's specific risk profile.

[Source: Franzen, D. (2010). Managing investment risk in defined benefit pension funds. OECD Working Papers on Insurance and Private Pensions, No. 38, OECD Publishing. doi: 10.1787/5kmjnr3sr2f3-en]

An excerpt from 'The case for the cult of the equity'

Reasons for the ability of pension funds to hold a much higher percentage of equities in their portfolios than life assurance funds:

1. Inflation Matching
2. Duration Matching
3. Lower Risk
4. Volatility Of Reported Profits
5. Market Depth
6. Liquidity

Source: Goobey, G.R. (1955). **Pension fund investments [LMA/4481/A/01/001]. Pension archives.**
Retrieved from <http://www.pensionsarchive.org.uk/58/>

Summary and Conclusion

- I. Greater movement to insurer-managed assets in the past two yrs,
- II. 70% of NSE50 companies invest in low asset risks,
- III. Independence observed between:
 - a) *Funding level and fund manager choice*
 - b) *Funding level and asset risks*
 - c) *Fund manager choice and asset risks*
- IV. Higher risk taking (e.g. equity proportion above 15%) only possible with insurer plans within the present regulatory framework,
- V. NSE50 funding levels consistently in the 90% range,
- VI. Disclosure of equity proportion in assets is not consistent,
- VII. Education needed on investing in real asset classes to match the real nature of long-term liabilities (ACTGL in OCI helps).

Scope for further research

- i. Longitudinal metrics on funding and fund managers could be developed.
- ii. Risk metrics of DB funds could be developed.
- iii. Both the number of companies and the coverage period in terms of the number of financial years can be increased to support the conclusions.
- iv. Limited prior work on Indian organizational DB funds.



Paper citation

Ankolekar, M., Shenoy, R., Nadkarni, N., & Shah, R. (2016). Indian Defined Benefit Pension Plans: Evidence on Investment Risks, Fund Mandates and Funding Levels. *Management and Labour Studies*, 41(4), 355-383.